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To Give or to Grab: The Principle of Full, Crippled and Split Conferral of 
Powers Post-Lisbon 
 
Inge Govaere1 
 
 
 
1. Introduction 
 
The principle of conferral of powers occupies a prominent place in the Lisbon Treaty. 
Not only is it stated as a fundamental and horizontal principle in the common 
provisions of the Treaty on the European Union (Art. 5 TEU).2  For the first time 
utmost care has been given to lay down, in a Treaty text, also the modalities and the 
consequences of the application of this principle.3 As such, a catalogue of 
competence is introduced in Articles 2-6 TFEU which lists the “categories and areas 
of union competence” (Title I TFEU) whilst spelling out the nature of the 
competences conferred to the Union in those fields, for instance exclusive, shared or 
complementary. Moreover, it is recurrently and firmly stated that powers which are 
not conferred to the Union by the Treaties are to remain with the Member States (a.o. 
Arts. 4(1) & 5(2)TEU). Especially those new additions in the Treaties are revealing of 
the currently prevailing political context whereby the Member States seek to get a 
renewed grasp on the formulation, interpretation and application of the Treaty 
principle of conferral. This can hardly be considered in isolation from the 
development of case law of the CJEU, who deftly asserts exclusive jurisdiction to 
interpret this key structural principle of EU law.  
The importance of the principle of conferral to determine the structure, functioning 
and exercise of EU law can hardly be overestimated. From a sequential perspective 
the principle of conferral is necessarily the very first of all the structural principles to 
be applied. It may be difficult if not impossible to establish a full sequential order of 
the various structural principles underlying EU law, but all the other EU law principles 
are triggered only once this initial hurdle has successfully been taken by the EU.  
 
For a good understanding of the principle of conferral in all its complexity, it is 
opportune to clearly distinguish the following two functions.     
The principle of conferral is first and foremost the core principle that determines the 
delimitation of competence between the MS and the EU.4 At the same time it impacts 
                                                          
1 Professor Dr. Inge Govaere, Jean Monnet Chair in EU Legal Studies, Ghent University, Director of the 
Ghent European Law Institute (G.E.L.I.), and Director of the European Legal Studies Department of the 
College of Europe, Bruges. The final version of this paper will be published in Structural Principles in EU 
External Relations Law, edited by Marise Cremona, to be published by Hart Publishing in 2017. 
2 Article 5 TEU (Lisbon) stipulates as follows:  
“1. The limits of Union competences are governed by the principle of conferral. The use of Union 
competences is governed by the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality. 
2. Under the principle of conferral, the Union shall act only within the limits of the competences 
conferred upon it by the Member States in the Treaties to attain the objectives set out therein. 
Competences not conferred upon the Union in the Treaties remain with the Member States.” 
Note that the text of the Lisbon Treaty is much more substantial than the prior  formulation in the Nice 
Treaty and at that time inserted only in the EC Treaty pillar: 
Article 5 TEC (Nice) : 
“The Community shall act within the limits of the powers conferred upon it by this Treaty and of the 
objectives assigned to it therein.” 
3 On discussions and attempt pre-Lisbon, see for instance De Búrca, G., “Limiting EU powers”, 
European Constitutional law review, 2005, 92-98. 
4 Marise Cremona points to the following 2 dimensions for allocation of competence: the relationship 
EU-Member States and the relationship between internal and external powers, see Cremona, M., “EU 
3 
 
directly on the relations between the EU and/or its Member States with third countries 
and other international organisations as it underpins the limitations that may be 
placed on the legal personality of the Union.5  
The application of the principle of conferral also determines whether or not a subject 
matter comes within the ambit of the autonomous EU legal order, which is 
characterised by the exclusive jurisdiction of the CJEU,6  primacy and direct effect. 
As such it is the only one of all the Treaty principles that serves to determine whether 
and to what extent not only the EU at all has competence but, additionally, whether 
and to what extent the CJEU may exercise exclusive jurisdiction.  
The outcome of the application of the principle of conferral may nonetheless be very 
different in terms of the EU autonomous legal order as compared to EU competence. 
The Lisbon Treaty formally abolishes the pillar structure and introduces one legal 
personality for the whole EU, but this is not always and necessarily fully matched in 
substance. In many if not most cases there will be a ‘plain’ or ‘full’ conferral with a 
perfect match in terms of EU competence and CJEU exclusive jurisdiction. However, 
the area of Common Foreign and Security Policy (hereafter ‘CFSP’) is still to a large 
extent kept outside the jurisdiction of the CJEU as well as democratic control by the 
EP.7 This may lead to what one could call a ‘crippled conferral’, meaning that 
competence is conferred on the EU without the corresponding conferral to the 
autonomous EU legal order. Both judicial and democratic control are then left at the 
level of the sole Member States.  Another complicating factor is that the integration of 
the former third pillar matters of Justice and Home Affairs into the autonomous EU 
legal system has entailed the importation of the corresponding opt outs for certain 
Member States.8 This implies that both EU competence and CJEU exclusive 
jurisdiction may be conferred on the Union by some Member States but not by 
others, thus leading to a situation of ‘split conferral’. It is not inconceivable that the 
possibility to adopt CFSP measures under the constructive abstention mechanism,9 
whereby a Member State allows the other Member States to go ahead without being 
bound by the measure itself, could in practice even give rise to claims of a ‘crippled 
split conferral’. 
Especially since the Lisbon Treaty it is therefore no longer sufficient to  determine 
‘whether’ competence is conferred to the Union by the Treaties in any given case. 
The renewed line of questioning after the Lisbon Treaty is first of all ‘who’ may 
determine whether competence has been transferred to the Union. The first section 
will therefore address the issue of whether conferral of competence is ‘to give or to 
grab’. In other words, is this now placed firmly in the hands of the Member States as 
masters of the Treaties, through the insertion of the catalogue of competence? Or 
may the CJEU still continue to claim exclusive jurisdiction to settle EU competence 
issues, including the extent of its own jurisdiction?  
The second section will tackle the other and perhaps even more important new 
development to be discerned in the case law. In a post–Lisbon setting the outspoken 
or underlying question has increasingly become the determination of the ‘modalities’ 
of the conferral of competence to the Union, be it in a plain, crippled or split form. As 
such it is not only important to know whether the EU has been attributed competence 
but also on what legal basis this was, or should have been, done. A crucial question 
thereby is to know whether it is the legal basis that determines the plain, crippled or 
                                                                                                                                                                      
external relations:l unity and conferral of powers”,  in Azoulai; L. (ed.), The question of competence in 
the European Union, Oxford University Press, 2014, at p. 65. 
5 Article 47 TEU reads: “The Union shall have legal personality.” 
6 Article 19 TEU juncto Article 344 TFEU. 
7 Article 24 TEU. 
8 Protocol N° 21, opt out  of the UK and Ireland; Protocol N° 22, special opt out for Denmark.   
9 Article 31 TEU. 
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split form of conferral, both in theory and practice, or whether the prospect of a 
crippled or split EU action at all influences the finding of the proper legal basis.  
By way of caveat, it should be underlined that the Lisbon Treaty reforms have 
sparked a renewed impetus of cases questioning the external competence of the 
Union in all its complexities. In spite of the sequential importance of the principle of 
conferral it is in practice not always easy to ‘isolate’ this principle from other 
arguments, such as the application of the principle of institutional balance and/or the 
duty of sincere cooperation as laid down in Article 13(2) TEU and Article 4(3) TEU.10 
Conversely, it is not because the principle of conferral is invoked in any given case 
that it is also really in dispute. For instance in the OIV case Germany expressly 
invoked the principle of conferral albeit it did not really dispute the competence of the 
EU in the matter. Germany rather seemed to oppose to the implications for the 
Member States as well as to question to modalities of exercise of EU competence in 
international fora.11 
 
2. Section I: The Quest for Control of the Principle of Conferral  
 
2.1.Full conferral of competence: the proper legal basis 
 
The Member States’ endeavour to gain control over the principle of conferral as a 
reaction to prior case-law of the CJEU can be discerned throughout the Lisbon 
Treaty. Contrary to what may be expected, this is not always and necessarily to 
restrict the transfer of competence to the Union. This is perfectly illustrated by the 
reaction in the Lisbon Treaty to prior case-law of the CJEU concluding to the 
absence of competence for the Union to adhere to the ECHR.12 A remedy is now 
provided by the insertion of a legal basis in Article 6 TEU stipulating that the EU ‘shall 
accede’ to the ECHR, thereby expressly conferring the competence to do so to the 
EU. The crucial question still left to be solved, especially after Opinion 2/13, is how to 
safeguard the autonomy of the EU legal order in this accession process.13  
Mostly, however, the Lisbon Treaty does not mean to transfer new competence to 
the Union. Rather the catalogue of competence inserted in Articles 2-6 TFEU 
appears to a large extent to codify prior case law of the CJEU in a static manner. The 
Lisbon Treaty expressly lists the subject matters that fall under exclusive, shared or 
complementary competence of the Union. But it also goes further, as the Lisbon 
Treaty  additionally spells out the different modalities, as well as consequences for 
the Member States, of the conferral of competence.14 
                                                          
10 For a recent example, see Case C-73/14, Council v. Commission (IRLOS), of 6 October 2015, 
ECLI:EU:C:2015:663. For an analysis of prior cases relating to the duty of sincere cooperation,  see for 
instance  Klamert, M., “The Principle of Loyalty in EU Law”, Oxford University Press, 2014;  Neframi, E., 
“The duty of loyalty: rethinking its scope through its application in the field of EU external relations”, 
C.M.L.Rev. (2010) 323-359; Casteleiro, .A., Larik, J., “The duty to remain silent: limitless loyalty in EU 
external relations ?”, E.L.Rev. (2011) 524-541.   
11 Case C‑ 399/12, Germany v Council, ECLI:EU:C:2014:2258. For an analysis of the issues at stake in 
this case, see Govaere, I., “Novel Issues Pertaining to EU Member States Membership of other 
International Organisations: The OIV Case”,  in Govaere, Van Elsuwege, Stanislas, Lannon, (eds.)., the 
EU in the World, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2014, pp. 225-243. 
12 Opinion 2/94, Accession by the Community to the European Convention for the Protection of Human 
Rights and Fundamental Freedoms,  ECLI:EU:C:1996:140. 
13 Article 6 TEU states the objective of accession to the ECHR yet does not determine the modalities to 
do so. The key issue is to safeguard the autonomy of the EU legal order in the process, see the 
negative opinion on the daft accession agreement, Opinion 2/13, Accession of the European Union to 
the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (II), 
ECLI:EU:C:2014:2454. 
14 For instance,  Article 2 TFEU reads: 
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The catalogue of competence thus provides some clarity and transparency which 
before was sometimes lacking. Unfortunately in so-doing it also creates a false sense 
of legal certainty as it leaves crucial issues regarding the principle of conferral 
untouched and unresolved. What, for instance, is the precise scope of the newly 
formulated Common Commercial Policy (CCP),15 which is now expressly listed 
among the exclusive competence of the EU in Article 3(1) TFEU ? How should the 
conferral of competence be formulated if an agreement relates to different policies, 
such as both CCP and the internal market, which are listed respectively as exclusive 
and shared competence ? Not surprisingly such questions were already at the core 
of the early post-Lisbon case law of the CJEU in the Daiichi Sankyo16 as well as the 
‘conditional access’17 judgments.18 The CJEU thus necessarily had to come up with 
new delineating criteria not expressly listed in the Lisbon Treaty to determine the 
precise legal basis of conferral of competence to the EU. As such it clarified that a 
CCP relates to measures which ‘specifically’ relate to international trade. This was 
fulfilled in both cases as they concerned either ‘external harmonization’ of intellectual 
property rights in the framework of TRIPS/WTO,19  or the ‘externalisation of the 
internal market acquis’ for application in third countries.20  
In spite of all the efforts made by the Member States to control the conferral of 
competence to the Union it thus immediately became apparent with those first post-
Lisbon cases that they did not manage to completely forego the role of the CJEU in 
interpreting the newly inserted catalogue of competence. However, in terms of 
modalities of conferral these were rather easy cases. The use of either legal basis, 
CCP or internal market, anyhow implied a ‘full’ conferral of competence, thus 
simultaneously to both the EU and the autonomous EU legal order. Considered from 
a constitutional perspective21 and maintaining inter-institutional balance the stakes 
were surely important, but with retrospect not all that high as they initially seemed. 
                                                                                                                                                                      
“1. When the Treaties confer on the Union exclusive competence in a specific area, only the Union may 
legislate and adopt legally binding acts, the Member States being able to do so themselves only if so 
empowered by the Union or for the implementation of Union acts. 
2. When the Treaties confer on the Union a competence shared with the Member States in a specific 
area, the Union and the Member States may legislate and adopt legally binding acts in that area. The 
Member States shall exercise their competence to the extent that the Union has not exercised its 
competence. The Member States shall again exercise their competence to the extent that the Union has 
decided to cease exercising its competence.”    
15 Article 207 TFEU expressly opens up the scope of CCP to include commercial aspects of intellectual 
property rights, services and foreign direct investments.  
16 Case C-414/11, Daiichi Sankyo, Judgment of the Court (Grand Chamber) of 18 July 2013, 
ECLI:EU:C:2013:520.  
17 Case C-137/12,  Commission v Council (European Convention on the legal protection of services 
based on, or consisting of, conditional access), Judgment of the Court (Grand Chamber) of 22 October 
2013, ECLI:EU:C:2013:675. 
18 See inter alia Larik, J., “No mixed feelings: The post-Lisbon Common Commercial Policy in Daiichi 
Sankyo and Commission v. Council (Conditional Access Convention)”, Common Market Law 
Review(2015) p.779-799: . Ankersmit, L., “The Scope of the Common Commercial Policy after 
Lisbon:The Daiichi Sankyo and Conditional Access Services Grand Chamber Judgments”, Legal Issues 
of Economic Integration (2014) p.193-209. 
19 Case C-414/11, Daiichi Sankyo , o.c., para 52-53. The contextual criterion seemed very important in 
the Daiichi Sankyo case, thus begging the question of the legal basis for so-called TRIPS+ provisions in 
bilateral agreements. On such TRIPS+ obligations, see the respective contributions : Aleman, M., 
“Impact of TRIPS-Plus obligations in economic partnership – and free trade agreements on international 
IP law; Nadde-Phlix, S., “IP protection in EU free trade agreements vis-à-vis IP negotiations in the 
WTO”, both in Drexl et al (eds.), EU bilateral trade agreements and intellectual property: for better or 
worse ?, Springer, 2014 at respectively pp. 61-85 and 133-156. 
20 Case C-137/12,  Commission v Council (European Convention on the legal protection of services 
based on, or consisting of, conditional access), o.c., para 64-65. 
21 The CJEU consistently holds that the choice of legal basis has constitutional significance, see Opinion 
2/00, Cartagena Protocol, ECLI:EU:C:2001:664, at para 5.  
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The above judgments were rapidly followed by more truly challenging cases in terms 
of conferral of competences post-Lisbon.  
 
2.2.Conferral of competence: to give or to grab ?   
 
A degree of complexity was already added in the cases where the Member States 
pointed out that they clearly meant to reserve competence to themselves by virtue of 
the Lisbon Treaty. Such was the firm position of the Council and the Member States 
in both the “Broadcasting Organisations” case22 and Opinion 1/13.23 In both cases 
they argued that the Member States, as masters of the Treaties, had on purpose only 
expressly inserted the ERTA test of ‘to affect internal measures or alter their scope’ 
in Article 3(2) TFEU. In other words, they claimed that the Lisbon Treaty only partially 
codified prior implied powers case law of the CJEU. The intended effect was thus to 
lead to a reversal of prior case law of the CJEU in the ILO24 and Lugano 
Convention25 Opinions which introduced the test of ‘already covered to a large 
extent’.26 It was spelled out to the CJEU that to reinstate the latter case law post-
Lisbon would amount to an “unlawful extension of the scope of Article 3(3) TFEU 
contrary to the principle of conferral”.27  
This argument fully exposes the underlying quest for control over the principle of 
conferral through the introduction and formulation of the catalogue of competence in 
the Lisbon Treaty. Is EU competence for the Member States to give, and if so also to 
freely take back, by virtue of the Treaties ? Or is conferral of competence a concept 
of EU law so that the CJEU may firmly grab control in order to safeguard a uniform 
and binding interpretation for all the Member States alike ?   
It does not come as a total surprise that the CJEU was clearly not inclined to follow 
the Member States in a textual interpretation of the Treaty provisions. Instead it again 
turned to its habitual purposive method of interpretation of the Treaties, whereby it 
interprets individual EU law provisions in the light of the objectives of the EU 
Treaties.28 As such, it pointed out that the ILO and Lugano Convention developments 
in implied powers reasoning were not new and separate tests but rather 
interpretations of the original ERTA-test, which could thus anyhow still be applied 
post-Lisbon.29 At least for the sake of clarity as to who controls the principle of 
                                                          
22 Case C‑ 114/12, Commission v Council, Convention of the Council of Europe on the protection of the 
rights of broadcasting organisations, ECLI:EU:C:2014:2151. 
23 Opinion 1/13, Convention on the civil aspects of international child abduction, ECLI:EU:C:2014:2303 
24 Opinion 2/91, Convention Nº 170 of the International Labour Organization concerning safety in the 
use of chemicals at work, ECLI:EU:C:1993:106. 
25 Opinion 1/03,  Lugano Convention on jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of judgments 
in civil and commercial matters, ECLI:EU:C:2006:81. 
26 Opinion 1/03 enlarges this to include ‘foreseeable developments’ of EU law, see at para 126: 
“However, it is not necessary for the areas covered by the international agreement and the Community 
legislation to coincide fully. Where the test of 'an area which is already covered to a large extent by 
Community rules' (Opinion 2/91, paragraphs 25 and 26) is to be applied, the assessment must be based 
not only on the scope of the rules in question but also on their nature and content. It is also necessary to 
take into account not only the current state of Community law in the area in question but also its future 
development, insofar as that is foreseeable at the time of that analysis (see, to that effect, Opinion 2/91, 
paragraph 25).”  
27 Case C-114/12, o.c., at para 60. 
28 I have argued elsewhere that only a clear and express prohibition in the Treaties could limit the 
purposive method of interpretation, as the CJEU adopts a pro-legem, but not a contra-legem 
interpretation of the Treaties, see Govaere, I.,  “Setting the international scene”: EU external 
competence and procedures post-Lisbon revisited in the light of ECJ Opinion 1/13”, CMLRev,(2015) 
1277–1308.  
29 For a detailed analysis in terms of implied powers reasoning, see Govaere, I.,  “Setting the 
international scene”: EU external competence and procedures post-Lisbon revisited in the light of ECJ 
Opinion 1/13”, CMLRev,(2015) 1277–1308. 
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conferral, it is to be welcomed that the CJEU, contrary to for instance Advocate 
General Jääskinen in his view on Opinion 1/13,30 did not additionally search for the 
intention of the drafters of the Lisbon Treaty in order to guide its conclusions in 
casu.31 It also firmly rejected the reference to Protocol 25 by pointing out that this 
protocol only applies to Article 2(2) TFEU in relation to the exercise of shared 
competence, and cannot serve to limit the conferral of exclusive competence to the 
EU by virtue of Article 3(2) TFEU.32      
Yet what is then the meaning of the principle of conferral of competence for those 
cases? Rather than making an abstract assessment on the basis of the Treaty 
provisions, the CJEU indicated that, to answer this crucial question, an assessment 
of the ERTA criteria need to be made in concreto, in the light of each case.  In the 
words of the CJEU:  
“ That said, it is important to note that, since the European Union has only conferred 
powers, any competence, especially where it is exclusive, must have its basis in 
conclusions drawn from a specific analysis of the relationship between the envisaged 
international agreement and the EU law in force, from which it is clear that such an 
agreement is capable of affecting the common EU rules or of altering their scope 
(see, to that effect, Opinion 1/03, EU:C:2006:81, paragraph 124).” 33 
This forceful statement is most likely meant to act as a counterweight for the 
generous application and interpretation of the ERTA test. It is nonetheless difficult to 
disagree with Alan Rosas that the reasoning in Opinion 1/13 creates the impression 
of a low threshold for concluding to an ERTA effect,34 and thus to the conferral of 
competence to the EU.  
The same reasoning was already applied in the Broadcasting Organisations 
judgment. A bit more puzzling, however, considering that it concerns a structural 
principle of constitutional significance, is that the CJEU in the Broadcasting 
Organisations case then proceeds to point to the burden of proof specifically in 
relation to the principle of conferral: 
“In accordance with the principle of conferral as laid down in Article 5(1) and (2) TEU, 
it is, for the purposes of such an analysis, for the party concerned to provide 
evidence to establish the exclusive nature of the external competence of the EU on 
which it seeks to rely.”35 
Does the CJEU mean to say that there is a burden of proof solely in relation to the 
exclusive nature of EU competence, or with respect to the application of the principle 
of conferral itself ?  And on who rests such a burden of proof ? Should the 
Commission in casu provide all the necessary evidence, so as to avoid the 
conclusion that (exclusive) competence is not transferred to the EU ? If so, to what 
extent is it then really up to the Council and the Member States to prove that the 
negotiations ‘might also go beyond the EU acquis’ to support their claim that 
                                                          
30 View of AG Jääskinen, Opinion 1/13, ECLI:EU:C:2014:2292, at para 70. 
31 Yet note that in a very early post Lisbon case, the CJEU did point to the intention of the drafters of the 
Treaties, see Case C-130/10, European Parliament v Council  (Financial sanctions), 
ECLI:EU:C:2012:472, at para 82:  “Nevertheless, the difference between Article 75 TFEU and Article 
215 TFEU, so far as the Parliament’s involvement is concerned, is the result of the choice made by the 
framers of the Treaty of Lisbon conferring a more limited role on the Parliament with regard to the 
Union’s action under the CFSP.” 
32 Case C-114/12, o.c., at para 73. 
33 Case C-114/12, o.c., at para 74. Compare to Opinion 1/13, o.c., para 74, which is very similar in 
formulation but with the added reference to also ‘foreseeable developments’ of EU law by reference to 
Opinion 1/03. 
34 Rosas, A., EU external relations: exclusive competence revisited”, Fordham International Law Journal 
(2015) 1073-1096, at p. 1091. 
35 Case C-114/12, o.c., at para 75. 
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(exclusive) competence has not been conferred, rather than for the Commission to 
prove the contrary ?36  
In spite of those questions, the key issue with this reference to the burden of proof 
lies elsewhere. It could be maintained that the application of such a crucial structural 
principle as the principle of conferral should not depend mainly or even exclusively 
on whether the EU institutions have done their homework sufficiently well. Could, or 
even should, it not be applied ex officio by the CJEU ?  Considering the similarity in 
reasoning of the CJEU in both cases, it is striking that Opinion 1/13, which was 
rendered about 1 month after the Broadcasting Organisations case, no longer 
mentions the burden of proof in relation to the principle of conferral. This may in part 
be due to the fact that here it concerned an advisory opinion rather than an adversary 
procedure, thereby clearly exposing the limits of the burden of proof approach 
adopted in the Broadcasting Organisations case. What those cases reveal, however, 
is that the CJEU has maintained the application of the principle of conferral firmly 
within its grasp also post-Lisbon. Yet in so-doing it appears to be struggling to 
ascertain the precise grounds for, and limits to, its exclusive jurisdiction.  
 
3. Section 2: Special Modalities of Conferral 
 
In post-Lisbon practice not many cases openly address the issue of whether or not 
external power is at all conferred to the EU, in spite of the theoretical importance of 
the question,. More often cases expressly or impliedly raise the issue of the precise 
modalities of  the conferral,37 with the added difficulty in terms of possible crippled 
and/or split conferral of competence.  
 
3.1.Crippled and semi-crippled conferral of competence 
 
Also before the Lisbon Treaty it was theoretically possible to conclude to a crippled 
conferral of competence, whereby competence would be conferred to the EU without 
the corresponding conferral to the autonomous legal system. Pre-Lisbon both the 
CFSP and JAI pillars were to a large extent kept outside the scope of EU judicial and 
EU democratic control in favour of bundling such control at the level of the Member 
States. The practical effect thereof was, however, strongly mitigated by the clear 
statement in ex Article 47 TEU that the two EU pillars should not affect the EC pillar. 
This allowed the CJEU to jealousy shield the external acquis communautaire against 
any unwarranted influence from those intergovernmental pillars.38 Full conferral of 
competence to the EC was thus systematically favoured over a crippled conferral to 
the EU. The Lisbon Treaty has fundamentally altered this given. 
 
a. Redressing full and crippled competence 
 
The Lisbon Treaty at first sight simplifies the system. It formally abolishes the pillar 
structure which leads to the incorporation of the former third pillar into the 
autonomous EU legal order.39 But at the same time it re-inserts the CFSP as a 
‘horizontal pillar’40 by stipulating in Article 24 TEU that “(t)he common foreign and 
                                                          
36 Case C-114/12, o.c., at para 95. 
37 See above pt. 2. for full or plain conferral cases. 
38 See especially Case C-91/05, Commission v Council, ECOWAS, ECLI:EU:C:2008:288. On this case, 
see for instance Van Vooren, B., “EU–EC External Competences after the Small Arms Judgment” 
(2009) 14 European Foreign Affairs Review, Issue 1, pp. 7–24. 
39 See below pt. 5. 
40 On this concept,  see Govaere, I., “Multi-faceted Single Legal Personality and a Hidden Horizontal 
Pillar: EU External Relations Post-Lisbon”, Cambridge Yearbook of European Legal Studies, Vol 13, 
2010-2011, pp. 87-112. 
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security policy is subject to specific rules and procedures”. In essence this implies 
that the inter-governmental approach still prevails for CFSP measures post-Lisbon, 
whereby also judicial and democratic control is largely kept at national level, thus 
outside the autonomous EU legal order.41 With respect to CFSP the major change in 
terms of conferral of competence is, however, to be found in Article 40 TEU which 
redrafts the former Article 47 TEU.42 It is still stipulated that CFSP shall not affect 
‘other external EU action’ listed in the TFEU. But, importantly, a counterweight is 
added in the second paragraph stipulating that that ‘other external EU action’ may 
not affect the exercise of the Union competences under CFSP.  
In so-doing the Lisbon Treaty radically alters the prior approach as it removes the 
possibility to systematically favour full conferral over crippled conferral of 
competence.43 This was clearly illustrated already by the very first post-Lisbon case, 
the Financial Sanctions case, relating to a dispute between the European Parliament 
and the Council on the proper legal basis to adopt restrictive measures against 
certain persons and entities associated with Usama bin Laden, the Al‑ Qaeda 
network and the Taliban.44 The European Parliament had expressly drawn the 
CJEU’s attention to the continuing crippled nature of conferral of competence by 
virtue of CFSP post-Lisbon. In particular the European Parliament evoked the 
consequences in terms of the of level of exercise of democratic control in case the 
legal basis for a full conferral, Article 75 TFEU, was rejected in favour of Article 215 
TFEU. 45 This case is nonetheless special for it only presented features of ‘semi-
crippled conferral’ as it concerned the adoption of financial sanctions which, even 
under CFSP, exceptionally come under judicial control of the CJEU.46 As such the 
only issue at stake was whether democratic control could be kept at the level of the 
Member States whilst conferring competence to the EU and exclusive jurisdiction to 
the CJEU.  
In line with the newly formulated Article 40 TEU, the CJEU firmly rejected the 
reasoning that the prospect of a full or (semi-)crippled conferral of competence 
should determine the legal basis withheld. The Court held that the fact that the 
European Parliament is only informed and not a co-legislator under CFSP cannot 
determine the choice of legal basis.47 Instead it agreed with the Council that “it is not 
procedures that define the legal basis of a measure but the legal basis of a measure 
                                                          
41 Article 24 TEU specifies: “It shall be defined and implemented by the European Council and the 
Council acting unanimously, except where the Treaties provide otherwise. The adoption of legislative 
acts shall be excluded. The common foreign and security policy shall be put into effect by the High 
Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy and by Member States, in 
accordance with the Treaties. The specific role of the European Parliament and of the Commission in 
this area is defined by the Treaties. The Court of Justice of the European Union shall not have 
jurisdiction with respect to these provisions, with the exception of its jurisdiction to monitor compliance 
with Article 40 of this Treaty and to review the legality of certain decisions as provided for by the second 
paragraph of Article 275 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union.” 
42 Article 40 TEU (ex Article 47 TEU) reads: 
“The implementation of the common foreign and security policy shall not affect the application of the 
procedures and the extent of the powers of the institutions laid down by the Treaties for the exercise of 
the Union competences referred to in Articles 3 to 6 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European 
Union. 
Similarly, the implementation of the policies listed in those Articles shall not affect the application of the 
procedures and the extent of the powers of the institutions laid down by the Treaties for the exercise of 
the Union competences under this Chapter.” 
43 See also Dashwood, A., “The Continuing Bipolarity of EU External Action”, in Govaere, Lannon, Van 
Elsuwege, Adam (eds.), “The European Union in the World “, Brill 2014, pp. 3-16. 
44 Case 130/10, EP v. Council, o.c.. 
45 Case 130/10, EP v. Council, o.c.., at para 32. 
46 Article 275 TFEU. 
47 Case 130/10, EP v. Council, o.c., para 79-80 
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that determines the procedures to be followed in adopting that measure”.48 The full 
importance of the renewed post-Lisbon setting in terms of conferral of competence 
was made clear by further underlining : “..the difference between Article 75 TFEU 
and Article 215 TFEU, so far as the Parliament’s involvement is concerned, is the 
result of the choice made by the framers of the Treaty of Lisbon conferring a more 
limited role on the Parliament with regard to the Union’s action under the CFSP”.49 
This clearly shows that all the Treaty legal bases relating to external relations are 
now on equal footing and should be assessed on their own merit.  
 
b. Mixed legal basis CFSP-Other external action ?  
 
The above finding leads to the next question: if in a post-Lisbon setting full conferral 
of competence can no longer be systematically favoured over crippled conferral, is it 
then at all conceivable to conclude to a mixed legal basis CFSP and other EU 
external action ? In other words, is it possible to combine full and crippled conferral of 
competence in relation to one and the same legal act ? The common procedural 
provision for the conclusion of agreements inserted by the Lisbon Treaty, Article 218 
TFEU, could perhaps seem to militate in favour of such a conclusion.50 However, the 
financial sanctions case raises important considerations in this respect. The CJEU 
pointed to the absence of democratic control by the EU under CFSP as compared to 
the full democratic control at EU level for other external action,51 to conclude 
forcefully  “(d)ifferences of that kind are such as to render those procedures 
incompatible”.52 The CJEU proceeded unequivocally to spell out the consequences: 
“It follows from the foregoing that, even if the contested regulation does pursue 
several objectives at the same time or have several components indissociably linked, 
without one’s being secondary to the other, the differences in the procedures 
applicable under Articles 75 TFEU and 215(2) TFEU mean that it is not possible for 
the two provisions to be cumulated, one with the other, in order to serve as a twofold 
legal basis for a measure such as the contested regulation”.53 If it is fundamentally 
incompatible to combine semi-crippled and full conferral of competence because of 
the different level of democratic control, then it would surely not be logical to allow for 
a mixed legal basis including a CFSP provision other than Article 215 TFEU.  A 
strong case can be made that truly crippled conferral under CFSP, whereby not only 
democratic control by the European Parliament but additionally all judicial control by 
                                                          
48 Case 130/10, EP v. Council, o.c., para 80 
49 Case 130/10, EP v. Council, o.c., para 82 
50 The fact that both CFSP and ‘other’ external relations agreements are to be concluded on the basis of 
Article 218 TFEU seems to set this question apart from the procedural  issue in relation to “mixed 
agreements” concluded on behalf of both the EU and its Member States. In relation to the latter, see 
Case C‑ 28/12 , Commission v. Council, Mixed international agreements, ECLI:EU:C:2015:282 , see 
especially at para 47-53.  At para 49 and 50, the CJEU points in particular to the following: “(49) First, 
that decision in fact merges two different acts, namely, on the one hand, an act relating to the signing of 
the agreements at issue on behalf of the European Union and their provisional application by it and, on 
the other, an act relating to the provisional application of those agreements by the Member States, 
without it being possible to discern which act reflects the will of the Council and which the will of the 
Member States. 
(50)  It follows that the Member States participated in the adoption of the act relating to the signing of the 
agreements at issue on behalf of the European Union and their provisional application by it although, 
under Article 218(5) TFEU, such an act must be adopted by the Council alone. Moreover, the Council 
was involved, as an EU institution, in the adoption of the act concerning the provisional application of 
those agreements by the Member States although such an act falls within the scope of, first of all, the 
internal law of each of those States and, then, international law.” For a comment, see Flaesch-Mougin, 
C., RTDEur (2015) 617-621. 
51 Case 130/10, EP v. Council, o.c., para 47 
52 Case 130/10, EP v. Council, o.c., para 48. 
53 Case 130/10, EP v. Council, o.c., para 49. 
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the CJEU is excluded, can never go hand in hand with a finding of full conferral on 
the basis of other Treaty provisions. One and the same measure can hardly at the 
same time be within and outside the autonomous EU legal order. But such a 
conclusion would then entail that, instead, a clear and often difficult choice will need 
to be made between CFSP and other EU external action as a legal basis where a 
measure has multiple objectives.     
 
c. Centre of gravity test 
 
This begs the question of what objective legal criteria could and should be used by 
the CJEU to determine the proper legal basis of the conferral. An easy answer is of 
course to point to the centre of gravity test to conclude to a full or crippled conferral of 
competence. But this is only half of the answer. The precise criteria to a be applied to 
establish the gravity in each and every case may be less easy to pinpoint in a 
satisfactory manner. Also this was illustrated by the Financial Sanctions case. Here 
the CJEU first invoked the centre of gravity test to proceeded to rule in favour of 
CFSP as the sole legal basis. It held in essence that Article 215 TFEU provides for 
action to counter the threat of ‘international’ terrorism, in relation to persons in third 
countries.54 This was held to be the case of the envisaged measure so that  Article 
75 TFEU, which should then be taken to refer to financial sanctions to counter threats 
‘internal’ to the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice, was not withheld. Not 
surprisingly, much of the debate in legal doctrine has focused precisely on these 
criteria laid down by the CJEU,55 as it seems especially difficult to isolate 
international from internal terrorism in practice.  
The centre of gravity test was also put forward in the subsequent Mauritius 
Agreement case56 which again opposed the European Parliament to the Council 
concerning a measure relating to both CFSP and other external action of the EU. Yet 
this time the dispute did not concern the proper legal basis for the conferral of the 
competence as such. The European Parliament in fact expressly agreed with the use 
of the sole legal basis of Article 37 TEU to the extent that the other external relations 
objectives were merely incidental to the principle aim of the Agreement relating to 
CFSP.57 Instead, the European Parliament sought to alter the status of the 
Agreement from a crippled conferral to more of a full conferral through the backdoor 
of the unitary procedural provision for the conclusion of agreements, Article 218 
TFEU.  
 
d. Reducing the Handicap 
 
The argument of the European Parliament in the Mauritius Agreement case first of all 
went that considering the underlying multiple objectives of the Mauritius Agreement it 
did not constitute an ‘agreement exclusively related to CFSP’, so that it should have 
been duly consulted pursuant to Article 218(6) TFEU.58 The CJEU however rejected 
                                                          
54 Case 130/10, EP v. Council, o.c., para 55-66. 
55 See for instance the respective contributions by Hillion, C.,  “Fighting Terrorism Through the Common 
Foreign and Security Policy” and  Czuczai, J., “ The Powers of the Council concerning the Emergency of 
International Terrorism after the Judgment in Case C-130/10 Parliament v. Council”, both in Govaere & 
Poli (eds.), “EU Management of Global Emergencies: Legal Framework for Combating Threats and 
Crises”, Brill, 2014, at pp. 75-95 and 97-110 respectively. 
56 Case C-658/11, European Parliament v Council, Mauritius Agreement , ECLI:EU:C:2014:2025. For a 
comment, see Van Elsuwege, P., “Securing the institutional balance in the procedure for concluding 
international agreements: European Parliament v. Council (Pirate Transfer Agreement with Mauritius)”,  
Common Market Law Review (2015) pp. 1379–1398. 
57 Case C-658/11, o.c., para 44-45. 
58 Article 218(6) TFEU reads as follows: “The Council, on a proposal by the negotiator, shall adopt a 
decision concluding the agreement. 
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this interpretation by reiterating that the substantive legal basis of a measure 
determines the procedure to be followed, and not vice versa, with the additional 
clarification that this includes the procedures under Article 218 (6) TFEU.59 In other 
words, if the sole legal basis legitimately withheld exclusively confers a crippled 
competence to the EU, then the handicap in terms of EU level democratic 
procedures cannot be remedied by pointing to other incidental (full) competence nor 
to the common procedural provision for the conclusion of agreements.60 
The second argument of the European Parliament was however more successful. 
The CJEU agreed that the Council had nonetheless infringed Article 218 (10) TFEU 
by failing to  immediately and fully inform the European Parliament at all stages of the 
procedure for negotiating and concluding the EU‑ Mauritius Agreement.61 The CJEU 
refused to equate the European Parliament’s exclusion from the procedures for 
negotiating and concluding a CFSP-based agreement with a total absence of a right 
of scrutiny. Instead, it pointed out that the Lisbon Treaty precisely enhanced the 
importance of the exercise, at EU level, of democratic scrutiny of EU external action 
by inserting this information obligation applicable to all the types of procedures listed 
in Article 218 TFEU, including CFSP. Article 218 (10) TFEU was held to be an 
essential procedural requirement, breach of which necessarily leads to the 
annulment of the contested  decision.62 
Very importantly, in so-doing the CJEU also forcefully claimed its own jurisdiction to 
fully interpret the common procedural provision of Article 218 TFEU. It firmly rejected 
the argument of the Council that, since the CJEU in principle has no jurisdiction to 
control CFSP, it also has no jurisdiction to rule on the legality of a measure adopted 
on the basis of CFSP. The CJEU pointed out that Articles 24 (1) TEU and 275 (1) 
TFEU introduce a derogation to the rule of general jurisdiction of the CJEU laid down 
                                                                                                                                                                      
Except where agreements relate exclusively to the common foreign and security policy, the Council shall 
adopt the decision concluding the agreement: 
(a) after obtaining the consent of the European Parliament in the following cases: 
(i) association agreements; 
(ii) agreement on Union accession to the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and 
Fundamental Freedoms; 
(iii) agreements establishing a specific institutional framework by organising cooperation procedures; 
(iv) agreements with important budgetary implications for the Union; 
(v) agreements covering fields to which either the ordinary legislative procedure applies, or the special 
legislative procedure where consent by the European Parliament is required. 
The European Parliament and the Council may, in an urgent situation, agree upon a time-limit for 
consent. 
(b) after consulting the European Parliament in other cases. The European Parliament shall deliver its 
opinion within a time-limit which the Council may set depending on the urgency of the matter. In the 
absence of an opinion within that time-limit, the Council may act.” 
59 Case C-658/11, o.c., para 57-58. The CJEU first reasoned in terms of symmetry in internal measures  
and international agreements, in compliance with the institutional balance, see also para 56. 
60 The CJEU further reasoned as follows in para 60:: “That interpretation is justified particularly in the 
light of the requirements relating to legal certainty. By anchoring the procedural legal basis to the 
substantive legal basis of a measure, this interpretation enables the applicable procedure to be 
determined on the basis of objective criteria that are amenable to judicial review, as noted in paragraph 
43 of the present judgment. That ensures consistency, moreover, in the choice of legal bases for a 
measure. By contrast, the interpretation advocated by the Parliament would have the effect of 
introducing a degree of uncertainty and inconsistency into that choice, in so far as it would be liable to 
result in the application of different procedures to acts of EU law which have the same substantive legal 
basis.” 
61 Case C-658/11, o.c., para 75-76. 
62 Case C-658/11, o.c., para 79-87. However, the CJEU added: “It must be acknowledged that 
annulment of the contested decision without maintenance of its effects would be liable to hamper the 
conduct of operations carried out on the basis of the EU-Mauritius Agreement and, in particular, the full 
effectiveness of the prosecutions and trials of suspected pirates arrested by EUNAVFOR.”(para 90). 
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in Article 19 TEU, so that, as all derogations, they “must, therefore, be interpreted 
narrowly”.63  The CJEU concluded that: 
 “it cannot be argued that the scope of the limitation, by way of derogation, on the 
Court’s jurisdiction envisaged in the final sentence of the second subparagraph of 
Article 24(1) TEU and in Article 275 TFEU goes so far as to preclude the Court from 
having jurisdiction to interpret and apply a provision such as Article 218 TFEU which 
does not fall within the CFSP, even though it lays down the procedure on the basis of 
which an act falling within the CFSP has been adopted”.64  
As a consequence, the  CJEU may thus annul any decision, including exclusively 
CFSP measures, for breach of an essential procedural requirement listed in Article 
218 TFEU. As a counterpart, this most likely entails that the CJEU would also claim 
jurisdiction to deliver a corresponding Advisory Opinion under Article 218 (11) TFEU, 
not shying away from envisaged CFSP agreements. The recent statement by the 
CJEU that “Article 218 TFEU constitutes, as regards the conclusion of international 
treaties, an autonomous and general provision of constitutional scope”,65 appears to 
be foreboding in this respect.  
As a result of such case-law which deftly explores the potential of the unitary 
procedural provision of Article 218 TFEU, CFSP  thus  becomes a bit less of a 
crippled competence than it was most likely intended to be by the Member States in 
the Lisbon Treaty. One may discern an echo to pre-Lisbon case law, notably in the 
Kadi cases,66 where the CJEU already firmly claimed jurisdiction to perform a legality 
control including of CFSP related measures for respect of fundamental rights.67 But 
as important as it may be, case law merely reduces and cannot totally overcome the 
initial handicap for the application of the autonomous EU legal order in CFSP matters 
written into the Lisbon Treaty. At best it qualifies the degree of crippled conferral 
short of turning it into a full conferral.   
 
3.2.Split conferral 
 
A different problem is posed where most but not all of the Member States confer 
competence to the EU.  Already prior to the Lisbon Treaty this was made possible by 
the insertion of the constructive abstention procedure as regards CFSP.68 A number 
of Member States may thus decide not to be bound by a CFSP measure but to allow 
the others to go ahead. For the latter the conferral of powers takes place without the 
corresponding transfer to the autonomous EU legal order. Using a CFSP legal basis 
together with the constructive abstention procedure thus in fact amounts to a 
combined split crippled conferral which remains to a large extent outside the control 
of the CJEU.   
 
 
                                                          
63 Case C-658/11,  o.c., para 70. 
64 Case C-658/11,  o.c., para 73. 
65 Case C‑ 425/13, Commission v. Council (Negotiating Directives) , ECLI:EU:C:2015:483, para 62. 
The main issue in this case concerned Article 218 (4)TFEU and institutional balance. 
66 Joined cases C-402/05 P and C-415/05 P, Kadi I, ECLI:EU:C:2008:461 and Joined cases C-584/10 
P, C-593/10 P and C-595/10 P, Kadi II, ECLI:EU:C:2013:518. Govaere, I., “The importance of 
International Developments in the case-law of the European Court of Justice: Kadi and the autonomy of 
the EC legal order”, in Hiscock, M. & van Caenegem, W. (eds.), The Internationalisation of Law: 
Legislation, Decision–Making, Practice and Education,  Edward Elgar Publishing, 2010, p. 316-340. 
Much has been written about these cases, see the doctrine mentioned in Poli, S., Tzanou, M., “The Kadi 
Rulings: A Survey of the Literature”, Yearbook of European Law (2009)   533-558; Avbelj, M., Fontanelli, 
F., Martinico, G. (eds). “Kadi on Trial: A Multifaceted Analysis of the Kadi Trial”, Routledge, 2014.  
67 Codified in Article 275 (2) TFEU by the Lisbon Treaty. 
68 Article 31 TEU. 
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a. Post-Lisbon split conferral 
 
The novelty of the Lisbon Treaty lies in the fact that the former third pillar is  
abolished and fully incorporated into the autonomous EU legal order, thus in principle 
leading to a full conferral of competence to the EU. The difficulty lies, however, in the 
fact that the opt-outs for the UK, Ireland and Denmark have been expressly 
confirmed to apply in a post-Lisbon setting.69 Triggering the opt outs with respect to 
external measures relating to the area of freedom, security and justice therefore 
amount to a straightforward split conferral under the control of the CJEU. This has 
induced a novel line of questioning in terms of external relations competence which, 
however, is still in a rather embryonic state.70  
The difficulty of coming to terms with those important variations of split conferral in a 
post-Lisbon era was not really acknowledged in the Mauritius Agreement case. 
Advocate General Bot did, however, expressly point to the necessity to delineate 
between the external action of respectively the EU as such, the Area of Freedom 
Security and Justice, and CFSP but without analysing the different modalities of 
conferral involved.71  
 
b. Split of full conferral 
 
The issue of the split conferral was posed again in the Philippines Agreement case.72 
Whereas it was not disputed that a double legal basis CCP and development 
cooperation was indicated in casu nor that the Agreement should be concluded in a 
mixed form, ie. on behalf of the both the EU and the Member States, the addition of 
other legal basis was source of conflict and institutional bickering. The CJEU in 
essence agreed with the Commission that development cooperation should be 
broadly interpreted so as to ‘absorb’ the provisions in the Agreement relating to 
transport and environment, but also re-admission of third country nationals.73 In so-
doing the CJEU downplayed the importance of the lack of conferral of competence 
by the UK, Ireland and Denmark by virtue of the opt outs. Instead it concluded to a 
full conferral to the EU by all the Member States under the development cooperation 
legal basis.  
Contrary to the environment and transport chapters, the CJEU did acknowledge that 
the Agreement contained ‘specific obligations’ for the contracting parties as concerns 
re-admission of third country nationals. In particular, the CJEU pointed out that the 
“Republic of the Philippines and the Member States undertake therein to readmit 
                                                          
69 See Protocols N° 21 and 22 respectively. This should be read together with Declaration  65: 
“Declaration by the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland on Article 75 of the Treaty on 
the Functioning of the European Union. 
The United Kingdom fully supports robust action with regard to adopting financial sanctions designed to 
prevent and combat terrorism and related activities. Therefore, the United Kingdom declares that it 
intends to exercise its right under Article 3 of the Protocol on the position of the United Kingdom and 
Ireland in respect of the area of freedom, security and justice to take part in the adoption of all proposals 
made under Article 75 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union”. 
70 See Govaere, I., and Demedts, V., ‘Quelle définition de l’“externe” en matière d’ELSJ? Le cadre et les 
enjeux’, La dimension extérieure de l’espace de liberté, de sécurité et de justice de l’Union européenne 
après le traité de Lisbonne, Bruylant, 2013, pp. 489-509; Neframi, E., ‘L’aspect externe de l’espace de 
liberté, de sécurité et de justice: quel respect des principes et objectifs de l’action extérieure de 
l’Union?’, La dimension extérieure de l’espace de liberté, de sécurité et de justice de l’Union 
européenne après le traité de Lisbonne, Bruylant, 2013, p. 509. 
71 Opinion Advocate General Bot, Case C-658/11, European Parliament v Council, Mauritius 
Agreement, ECLI:EU:C:2014:41, at para 106-108. 
72 Case C-377/12, Commission v Council, Philippines Agreement, ECLI:EU:C:2014:1903. 
73 On this case, see Broberg, M.,Holdgaard, R., “Demarcating the Union’s Development Cooperation 
Policy after Lisbon: Commission v. Council (Philippines PCFA)”, Common Market Law Review, (2015)  
pp. 547–567. 
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their nationals who do not fulfil, or no longer fulfil, the conditions of entry or residence 
on the territory of the other party, upon request by the latter and without undue delay 
once the nationality of those nationals has been established and due process carried 
out, and to provide their nationals with documents required for such purposes. They 
also agree to conclude an agreement governing admission and readmission as soon 
as possible”.74 In spite of such clear and specific obligations pinpointed in the 
Agreement, the CJEU nonetheless motivated the disregard of the opt outs by 
reference to the absence of ‘detailed’ provisions for the implementation of  the re-
admission process. The fact that reference is made in the Agreement to the future 
conclusion of a readmissions agreement apparently serves to support such a 
conclusion.75 On this basis the CJEU proceeded to state that “the provisions of the 
Framework Agreement relating to readmission of nationals of the contracting parties, 
to transport and to the environment do not contain obligations so extensive that they 
may be considered to constitute objectives distinct from those of development 
cooperation that are neither secondary nor indirect in relation to the latter 
objectives”.76 This reasoning immediately triggers the question as of when ‘specific’ 
provisions on re-admission of third country nationals would be considered to be 
‘sufficiently detailed’ and thus ‘sufficiently extensive’ so as to justify recourse to a split 
conferral legal basis.  
 
c. Mixed legal basis full and split conferral ? 
 
A crucial underlying issue is whether, and if so when, the CJEU would allow at all for 
a combined use of a full and split conferral as legal bases. It cannot go unnoticed that 
in the Philippines Agreement case the Commission had forcefully spelled out that in 
particular the addition of Article 79(3) TFEU as a legal basis would produce 
unwarranted legal effects, both internally and externally. The Commission had 
warned that such a legal basis would trigger the opt outs under Protocols N° 21 and 
N° 22 thereby leading not only to incompatible procedures but also to uncertainty 
about the degree of exercise of  the EU’s competence under Articles 3(2) TFEU and 
4(2) TFEU.77 The Council had countered this argument by first of all reiterating the 
CJEU’s statements in the above mentioned ‘crippled conferral’ cases, namely that “it 
is not procedures that define the legal basis of a measure but the legal basis of a 
measure that determines the procedures to be followed in adopting that measure”.78 
The Council also pointed out that the obligations of the various Member States may 
                                                          
74 Case C-377/12, o.c., para 57. 
75  Case C-377/12, o.c., para 58: Whilst Article 26(3) of the Framework Agreement does admittedly 
contain wording stating how requests for readmission are to be dealt with, the fact remains that, as is 
apparent from Article 26(2)(f), the readmission of persons residing without authorisation is included in 
Article 26 as one of the matters upon which cooperation on migration and development will have to 
focus, without it being covered at this stage by detailed provisions enabling its implementation, such as 
those contained in a readmission agreement. It cannot therefore be considered that Article 26 of the 
Framework Agreement prescribes in concrete terms the manner in which cooperation concerning 
readmission of nationals of the contracting parties is to be implemented, a conclusion which is 
reinforced by the commitment, in Article 26(4), to conclude a readmission agreement very soon. 
76   Case C-377/12, o.c., para 59. 
77 Case C-377/12, o.c., para 22. Article 3(2) TEU stipulates: “The Union shall offer its citizens an area of 
freedom, security and justice without internal frontiers, in which the free movement of persons is 
ensured in conjunction with appropriate measures with respect to external border controls, asylum, 
immigration and the prevention and combating of crime”. Article 4(2)TEU reads: “The Union shall 
respect the equality of Member States before the Treaties as well as their national identities, inherent in 
their fundamental structures, political and constitutional, inclusive of regional and local self-government. 
It shall respect their essential State functions, including ensuring the territorial integrity of the State, 
maintaining law and order and safeguarding national security. In particular, national security remains the 
sole responsibility of each Member State”. 
78 Case C-377/12, o.c., para 31. 
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not vary all that much in practice, as the opt out Member States may choose to opt in 
a particular measure or to conclude similar obligations with the third country 
bilaterally. It is clear, however, that in the latter case they would only be bound by 
virtue of international law and not by virtue of EU law, 79 thus not resolving the 
unwarranted legal effect the Commission is pointing to.  
Subsequent case law has clarified that “Protocol No 21 is not capable of having any 
effect whatsoever on the question of the correct legal basis for the adoption of the 
contested decision”.80 At least not in the sense that the UK could successfully claim 
the (additional) use of  Article 79 TFEU as the correct legal basis for external 
measures as soon as it related to the situation of third country nationals. Already in 
the EEA Agreement and Swiss Agreement81 cases relating to social security for EEA 
and Swiss nationals respectively, the CJEU followed the interpretation of Advocate 
General Kokott,82 whereby Article 79 TFEU is held to strictly relate to the 
development of external borders measures, in terms of border checks, asylum and 
migration.83 This was held to be different and even ‘manifestly irreconcilable’84 with 
the objectives of the EEA Agreement as the latter means to extend85 internal market 
measures to the third countries concerned.86 Full conferral of competence under 
Article 48 TFEU was therefore withheld rather than a split conferral on the basis of 
Article 79 TFEU.   
Interestingly, however, in the EEA Agreement cases the CJEU also plainly rejected 
the reasoning of the UK invoking the use of Article 79 TFEU for other similar 
decisions in relation to other third countries. It was spelled out that each act must be 
assessed on its own aim and content in order to establish the proper legal basis.87 In 
                                                          
79 This is also follows from Recitals 2 & 3 in the Preamble to the contested decision in the Philippines 
case:  
“(2)    The provisions of the [Framework] Agreement that fall within the scope of Part Three, Title V of 
the [FEU Treaty] bind the United Kingdom and Ireland as separate Contracting Parties, and not as part 
of the European Union, unless the European Union together with the United Kingdom and/or Ireland 
have jointly notified the Republic of the Philippines that the United Kingdom or Ireland is bound as part 
of the European Union in accordance with the Protocol (No 21) on the position of the United Kingdom 
and Ireland in respect of the area of Freedom, Security and Justice annexed to the [EU Treaty] and the 
[FEU Treaty]. If the United Kingdom and/or Ireland cease(s) to be bound as part of the European Union 
in accordance with Article 4a of the Protocol (No 21), the European Union together with the United 
Kingdom and/or Ireland are to immediately inform the Republic of the Philippines of any change in their 
position in which case they are to remain bound by the provisions of the [Framework] Agreement in their 
own right. The same applies to Denmark in accordance with the Protocol (No 22) on the position of 
Denmark annexed to those Treaties. 
(3)      Where the United Kingdom and/or Ireland has/have not provided the notification required under 
Article 3 of the Protocol (No 21) on the position of the United Kingdom and Ireland in respect of the area 
of Freedom, Security and Justice, they do not take part in the adoption by the Council of this Decision to 
the extent that it covers provisions pursuant to Part Three, Title V of the [FEU Treaty]. The same applies 
to Denmark in accordance with the Protocol (No 22) on the position of Denmark, annexed to the Treaty 
on European Union and the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union. “ 
80 Case C-81/13, UK v. Council (Turkey Agreement), ECLI:EU:C:2014:2449, para 37. 
81 Case C-656/11, UK v. Council (Swiss Agreement), ECLI:EU:C:2014:97. 
82 AG Kokott; Case C-431/11, UK v. Council, ECLI:EU:C:2013:187, para 39-41.  
83 Case C-431/11, UK v. Council, ECLI:EU:C:2013:589, para 63. 
84 Case C-431/11, UK v. Council, o.c., para 64. 
85 For a recent assessment of the functioning of the EEA agreement, see Fredriksen, H., Franklin, C., 
“Of pragmatism and principles: The EEA Agreement 20 years on”,  Common Market Law Review (2015) 
pp. 629–684. 
86 Case C-431/11, UK v. Council, o.c., para 58. The CJEU further pointed out that to allow the opt outs 
to be triggered in such a case would lead to two parallel regimes for the coordination of social security 
systems (para 65).  Also in Case C-656/11, o.c., did the CJEU point out that the European Union 
extended the application of its legislation concerning coordination of social security systems to the Swiss 
Confederation, see para 55-67.  
87 Case C-431/11, UK v. Council, o.c., para 66-67. 
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theory this would then imply that similar decisions relating to different Agreements 
could have a different legal basis and thus also entail different modalities in terms of 
conferral of competence. Such a reverse reasoning was subsequently invoked by the 
UK in the Turkey Agreement case, in order to justify a different outcome here and to  
accept Article 79 TFEU as the correct legal basis. The CJEU however rejected this 
conclusion by pointing out that besides the objectives and content also the ‘context’ 
of a measure needs to be taken into account, in particular where it concerns an 
amendment of rules adopted under an existing agreement.88 In casu the measure 
was adopted in the context of the EEC-Turkey 1963 Association Agreement, 
constituting a further step in the objective to progressively secure free movement for 
workers between the European Union and Turkey under the association 
agreement.89  
If the contextual setting was thus similar, the main difference was to be found in the 
different objective of the Turkey Association Agreement which falls short of the EEA 
Agreement objective to extend the internal market to the third country concerned. 
The CJEU therefore agreed with the UK that the contested decision could not 
legitimately be adopted exclusively on the basis of Article 48 TFEU.90 But it disagreed 
that it was the split conferral legal basis of Article 79 TFEU that should be added. The 
CJEU conceded to the UK that “it is true that Article 79(2)(b) TFEU empowers the 
European Union to adopt measures defining the rights of third-country nationals 
residing legally in a Member State, including the conditions governing freedom of 
movement and of residence in other Member States”.91 Only to immediately limit the 
scope of application to serve strictly the purposes of Article 79(1) TFEU in terms of 
the common immigration policy.92 Instead, the CJEU held that the respect for the 
principle of conferral, which was at stake in casu, could be safeguarded by the 
addition of Article 217 TFEU which was also the legal basis for initial association 
agreement. The latter legal basis provides full conferral of external competence to 
the EU in all the fields covered by the TFEU.   
Neither of those cases thus allowed for a combined full and split conferral, instead 
the legal basis which led to a full conferral was systematically preferred by the CJEU. 
The context criterion might in practice serve to exclude the addition of a split 
conferral legal basis to any post-Lisbon measure adopted in the context of a pre-
Lisbon agreement. Yet the Philippines Agreement case shows that it is also highly 
unlikely for the use of a double legal basis for conferral to become the standard 
procedure for post-Lisbon Agreements. 
 
Conclusion 
 
The Lisbon Treaty has triggered a renewed line of questioning with respect to the 
principle of conferral which goes to a large extent still unresolved. For sure the CJEU 
has firmly asserted its exclusive jurisdiction to interpret this crucial structural principle 
                                                          
88 Case C‑ 81/13, UK v. Council (Turkey Agreement), o.c., para 38. The CJEU referred in this respect 
to Case C-431/11, o.c., para 48, and Case C-656/11, o.c., para 50).     
89 Case C‑ 81/13, UK v. Council (Turkey Agreement), o.c., para 43-45. 
90 Case C‑ 81/13, UK v. Council (Turkey Agreement), o.c., para 59: “As a rule, it is only in the sphere of 
the internal policies and actions of the European Union or of the external actions relating to third 
countries which can be placed on the same footing as Member State of the European Union, according 
to the case-law cited in paragraph 58 of this judgment, that Article 48 TFEU empowers the European 
Union to adopt measures in this area”. 
91 Case C‑ 81/13, UK v. Council (Turkey Agreement), o.c. para 41. 
92 Case C‑ 81/13, UK v. Council (Turkey Agreement), o.c., para 42: , “that is to say for the purposes of 
the common immigration policy aimed at ensuring the efficient management of migration flows, fair 
treatment of third-country nationals residing legally in Member States, and the prevention of, and 
enhanced measures to combat, illegal immigration and trafficking in human beings” . 
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so as to determine whether or not competence is transferred to the EU in any given 
case.  But it appears to be more difficult to come to terms with the various post-
Lisbon modalities of conferral of powers to the EU and the variations in terms of full, 
crippled and split conferral.  
The CJEU recurrently states that it is the legal basis of a measure that determines 
the procedures to be followed, not vice versa. Such a statement does not always 
appear to be consonant with the impression created by the outcome of post-Lisbon 
case law. The above analysis of the cases rendered so far seems to indicate a 
systematic preference for conferral of competence to the EU and the autonomous EU 
legal order alike, be it under full conferral or a semi-crippled conferral. This in spite of 
Article 40 TEU which redresses the balance between CFSP and other external EU 
action. The handicap in terms of pure crippled conferral under CFSP, whereby 
control by both the CJEU and the European Parliament is in principle excluded, is as 
much as possible reduced by deftly exploring the potential of the unitary procedural 
procedure of Article 218 TFEU. It is most likely highly significant for future case law 
that the CJEU has recently labelled this procedural provision for the conclusion of 
agreements as ‘an autonomous and general provision of constitutional scope’.   
The post-Lisbon importance of possible split conferral scenarios has also been 
downplayed so far by the CJEU. To do so it pointed to the absence of sufficiently 
detailed provisions to warrant a split conferral or to the objective or context of the 
agreement which could justify a full conferral of competence.  
The question is what will be the outcome in case such a reasoning is no longer 
convincingly possible. Could one at all envisage a mixed legal bases combining full, 
split and/or crippled conferral ?  So far the CJEU has managed to steer away from 
this thorny issue but it is bound to arise in this difficult post-Lisbon setting, it is only a 
matter of time. 
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